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Abstract
We analyze how a change in ECB monetary policy affects lending of internationally active 
banks, depending on whether the currency of the claim is the one of the counterparty 
country, using Spanish individual bank data. We analyse the transmission from an outward 
perspective, exploring how banks adjust their foreign lending denominated in local and in 
foreign currency to changes in monetary policy, both cross-border and also through their 
affi liates located in other countries. We fi nd that non-bank private claims in local currency 
respond much less to the ECB monetary policy stance than claims in foreign currency. We 
also fi nd that the spillover effects on cross-border lending denominated in foreign currency 
depend on banks’ characteristics. When we broaden the analysis to include claims to the 
public and the fi nancial sector, the transmission of monetary policy is mainly through foreign 
currency loans, but bank heterogeneity plays a role in the transmission to local currency 
loans. In general, a tightening of the ECB monetary policy results in an increase in lending 
abroad. Exchange rate changes only affect foreign currency-denominated lending.  
Keywords: monetary policy, international banking, bank credit, spillovers.
JEL classifi cation: F34, F42, G15, G21.
Resumen
El artículo analiza cómo un cambio en la política monetaria del BCE afecta a los créditos 
concedidos por los bancos españoles con actividad internacional, dependiendo de si la 
moneda del préstamo es la del país de contraparte, utilizando datos bancarios individuales. 
Analizamos la transmisión desde una perspectiva externa, explorando cómo los bancos 
ajustan sus préstamos externos denominados en moneda local y en moneda extranjera a 
los cambios en la política monetaria, tanto si son transfronterizos como si son a través de 
sus fi liales ubicadas en otros países. Encontramos que los créditos al sector privado no 
bancario en moneda local responden mucho menos a cambios en la política monetaria 
del BCE que los préstamos en moneda extranjera. También encontramos que el impacto 
sobre los préstamos transfronterizos denominados en moneda extranjera depende de las 
características de los bancos. Cuando ampliamos el análisis para incluir los préstamos al 
sector público y fi nanciero, encontramos que la transmisión de la política monetaria se 
realiza principalmente a través de préstamos en moneda extranjera, pero la heterogeneidad 
bancaria desempeña un papel en la transmisión a préstamos en moneda local. En general, 
un endurecimiento de la política monetaria del BCE genera un aumento de los préstamos en
el exterior. Los cambios en el tipo de cambio solo afectan a los préstamos denominados 
en moneda extranjera.
Palabras clave: política monetaria, banca internacional, crédito bancario, spillovers.
Códigos JEL: F34, F42, G15, G21.
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1 Introduction 
The financial crisis has reactivated the debate over the possibility that monetary policy 
pursued by lending countries could have negative spillover effects in counterparty countries, 
through the international activity of banks that operate in foreign countries either through 
local affiliates or cross-border lending (e.g. Hofmann and Takats 2015, Bruno and Shin 
2015, Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012, Fratzscher et al. 2016, Chen et al. 2016, Correa and 
Murry, 2010). Such effect may further depend on the currency of the international transaction 
(Takats and Temesvary, 2016). The costly access to hedging of foreign currency risk or to 
borrowing in local currency may play a role in the cross-border transmission of monetary 
policy. Moreover, banking groups have followed different internationalization strategies 
(McCauley et al. 2010), which can be characterized in terms of the relevance of the role 
played by subsidiaries and local claims, in contrast to a strategy based on cross-border 
activity and intragroup funding (Gambacorta and van Rixtel, 2013). Both strategies have 
implications in terms of the currency denomination of loans, and through this channel may 
reinforce or mitigate the transmission of monetary policy abroad. 
Recent studies find empirical evidence of international transmission of monetary policy 
through its effects on the supply of loans abroad by internationally active banks1 . However, 
they reach conflicting conclusions as to the size and direction of such effect, with differential 
lending responses depending, in a large part, on the relevance of cross-border assets and 
liabilities in relation to total assets (Buch et al. 2018).  
Another line of research is devoted to addressing how monetary policy in a given 
currency spills over national borders (e.g. Takats and Temesvary, 2016; Avdjiev and Takats, 
2016; Avdjiev et al, 2018; Loeffler et al, 2017). These works, using BIS international data, either 
find that cross-border lending in a currency is affected by changes in the monetary policy of 
that currency (Takats and Temesvary, 2016) or that monetary easing in the currency of 
denomination of a loan (dollar or euro) typically leads to an expansion in cross-border bank 
lending denominated in that currency (Avdjiev et al. 2018). Loeffler et al. (2017) do not find 
evidence of outward transmission of monetary policy, but find that inward transmission of US 
monetary policy is larger, the more a bank funds its operations in US dollars.  
Digging deeper into the mechanism of transmission, some empirical and theoretical 
work has been devoted to the role of centralized funding, currency mismatches and liquidity 
management in credit allocation (Bruno and Shin, 2015; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012; Ivashina 
et al. 2015 ; Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2017). Using loan-level data on international syndicated lending 
activity, Ivashina et al. 2015 show that cross-border lending can depend on the bank’s 
currency choices used in funding and lending, with disproportionate responses to the lending 
that has a currency mismatch with the funding shock.  Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2017 show that the 
effects of currency volatility on banks risk do not only depend on the currency composition of 
banks’ balance sheet as borrowing firms do not perfectly hedge against exchange rate risk and 
therefore it may translate into credit risk for banks. 
                                                                          
1 See, for instance, the work that the International Banking Research Network (IBRN) has coordinated on the cross-border 
transmission of monetary policy through bank lending. (Buch et al. 2018). See Argimon et al 2018, for monetary policy 
transmission through other types of financial institutions. 
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The goal of this paper is to explore how changes in domestic monetary policy affect 
foreign lending of domestic banks, via their affiliates located in other countries and via direct 
cross-border lending by headquarters or other affiliates abroad, depending on whether the 
loans are in local currency or in foreign currency. We want to assess whether the international 
portfolio of a bank is affected by domestic monetary policy shocks, distinguishing between 
claims denominated in local currency and those denominated in foreign currency, as they may 
have different relative risks and may be differently affected by the monetary policy induced 
exchange rate changes. As a monetary tightening at home leads to exchange rate 
appreciation, we can expect that the bank’s management of exchange rate risk may lead to 
different effects depending on the currency of the claims, controlling for its change in 
denomination2 . The paper considers the transmission of monetary policy from an outward 
perspective, using supervisory data for banks headquartered in Spain to assess the relevance 
of spillover effects. The paper follows the strategy of analysis introduced by Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) and later applied by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) to the international context to better 
identify the channels and the effect of monetary policy, following the approach in Buch et al. 
(2018) of identification through bank heterogeneity.  
We find that non-bank private claims in local currency respond much less to the ECB 
monetary policy stance than claims in foreign currency. We find evidence that the cross-border 
transmission of monetary policy to the real sector takes place, mostly, through cross-border 
claims denominated in foreign currency. We also find that the spillover effects on cross-border 
lending denominated in foreign currency depend on banks’ characteristics. When we broaden 
the analysis to include claims to the public and the financial sector, the transmission of 
monetary policy is mainly through foreign currency loans, but bank heterogeneity plays a role in 
the transmission to local currency loans. In general, a tightening of the ECB monetary policy 
results in an increase in lending abroad. Finally, we also gather evidence that exchange rate 
changes only affect lending denominated in foreign currency. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, the use of individual bank-level data 
allows us to better identify the effects of monetary policy on the foreign claims of banks and the 
channels of transmission or form of friction. Second and more importantly, we focus on the 
differential effects of local versus foreign currency for the outward transmission of monetary 
policy shocks taking into account the counterparty country, which to our knowledge, has not 
been addressed yet3.  And third, we provide evidence on the relevance of bank’s reliance on 
local activity in local currency, as an internationalization model, for the cross-border spillover 
effects of monetary policy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 describes 
the empirical approach. The results for bank lending to the private sector by currency of 
denomination and distinguishing by type of claims are in Section 4.  Section 5 presents the 
results for lending to the whole economy. Section 6 addresses the direct relevance of 
exchange rate changes and Section 7 concludes.   
                                                                          
2 The stock of assets denominated in foreign currency is automatically reduced with an exchange rate appreciation (when 
converted back into the reporting currency, which is the home currency. 
3 Loeffler et al. 2017 analyse the inward  transmission of monetary policy, i.e. the effects on the home country of monetary 
policies of jurisdictions where the bank has activity.
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2 Data  
We use quarterly balance sheet confidential reports submitted by Spanish banks to the Banco 
de España, for the prudential supervision of the Spanish banking system, covering the period 
2000Q1 to 2014Q4. We analyse the international activity of all Spanish banks and, among 
them, of those that have foreign affiliates that are classified as credit institutions or financial 
credit institutions4. Spanish banks expanded internationally, mostly at the end of the nineties, 
although some banks increased their geographical scope in the twenty first century, so that we 
observe several banks changing from domestic to international in our database.  
We use and combine different supervisory reports provided by banks to the national 
central bank. The data for the foreign activity of Spanish banks are taken from bank-specific 
reporting to the Banco de España for the BIS International Banking Statistics, so that they are 
internationally comparable. These bank-specific data are accessible within the Banco de 
España for research and policy purposes, besides its supervisory use, but are not publicly 
shared. Each banking group (or individual bank) has to provide data to the supervisor, in 
relation to each foreign affiliate or when its cross-border activity to a specific country is above 5 
million €. In particular, we use the information provided by banks by counterparty country. We 
consider the claims of a bank in a given country that are provided by either branches or 
subsidiaries established abroad with residents in that country (local lending) or which are 
provided from other affiliates of the banking group not located in that country (cross-border 
lending). We analyze them jointly and separately to test for the possibility of different 
transmission effects between these two types of claims on top of the potential differences by 
currency denomination. The initial database consists of 72 internationally active Spanish banks 
in 103 countries. 
For the Spanish banking system as a whole the weight of total foreign claims over 
total assets has been above 40% since 2005 and has been increasing since the crisis, in 
contrast to the sharp decline observed in international bank loans in most jurisdictions 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). This does not imply that Spanish banks have been alien to 
the generalised tendency of global banks since the crisis to retrench from some geographical 
regions and/or business lines, but the overall weight of foreign activity has increased. 
Moreover, the weight of local claims over total foreign claims (and of local liabilities over total 
foreign liabilities) has been above 75% (Figure 1) in the same period, which makes the 
Spanish banking system stand out as one with the largest share of local activity among the 
major banking systems (McCauley et al. 2010). 
We focus the analysis on total claims on the private non-financial sector of each 
country5, which on average account for half the total claims abroad, as we are interested in the 
real sector effects. We use claims on non-euro-area residents only, as claims on euro-area 
residents should be considered domestic because we are trying to assess the effect of the 
common ECB monetary policy. We distinguish between lending in foreign and in local currency 
in each counterparty country. Table A1 contains the average, minimum and maximum values, 
                                                                          
4 The so-called «Filiales entidades de crédito y filiales establecimientos financieros de crédito”. We link bank subsidiaries to 
their parent bank when it holds at least 50% of a bank’s equity or has its control. 
5 In particular, we use total financial assets which are not capital instruments, nor derivatives and which are not to Public 
Administrations, Central Banks or Credit institutions.  
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calculated on a yearly basis, of the weight that local and foreign denominated loans in a 
country have on total foreign loans. 
For the Spanish banking system as a whole, the weight of foreign claims denominated 
in local currency (i.e. the domestic currency of the counterparty country) over total foreign 
claims to the private sector is over 65% in all the period of analysis and nearly reaches 90% 
since 2009, as recorded in Figure 2. However, this reflects the activity of large banks, as if we 
consider bank averages, the weight of claims denominated in foreign currency is above 77% of 
total private claims (Figure 3). In fact, the relevance of currency denomination and type of claim 
differ between largest and smallest banks, so that for small banks cross-border claims 
denominated in foreign currency account on average for more than 87% of total foreign claims, 
while for large banks this proportion is reduced to 46%. In particular, for the largest two banks, 
the proportion of claims denominated in foreign currency is below 20%. At the level of banks, 
local claims account for more than 90% of total activity in local currency, while cross-border 
claims are more concentrated in foreign currency (Figure 3), for both large and small banks. 
Cross-border claims in local currency still account on average for over 11% of total claims, a 
proportion which is 18% for the largest eight banks.  
A change in reporting took place in the second term of 2005, which resulted in 
changes in the definitions of some reported variables, among which total assets. While we have 
a homogeneous series for the assets at the consolidated level, we do not have such 
homogeneity in the data referring to the activity of subsidiaries abroad and cross-border data, 
although the changes need not be very large and should not affect the results.  
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3 Empirical method and variable definition 
To analyse how changes in domestic monetary policy affect changes in Spanish banks’ lending 
to the non-bank private sector abroad, we start by estimating equations of the type: 




݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ ൅ ߙͶܾܺǡݐെͳ ൅ ߙͷܼ௧ିଵ
݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ ൅ ߙ͸ܼ݆ǡݐെͳ ൅ ߙ͹ܸܫܺݐെͳ ൅ ݂ܾ 
൅ ௝݂ ൅ ߝ௕ǡ௝ǡ௧                       (1) 
The dependent variable · Yb,j,t is the lending provided by Spanish bank b in country j 
in quarter t, obtained as the log change in lending, adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations, to 
proxy banks’ foreign flows. Specifically, it is the difference between the natural log of the claims 
at t and the natural log of the exchange rate-adjusted outstanding claims at t-1. We drop 
observations if the change in log claims is > 1 or < -1 (thus excluding most major changes due 
to mergers and acquisitions and other structural breaks). We exclude bank-country 
observations at time t if only one bank operates in that country at time t. We also drop bank-
country observations for which we do not have eight consecutive observations, that is, two full 
consecutive years of a bank’s activity in a given country. Finally, we drop foreign claims in 
countries for which we do not have information on their macroeconomic variables, which we 
need as controls. 
We initially focus the analysis on total loans to the private non-financial sector and in 
Section 5 we present the results considering all foreign exposures. Therefore, in this initial part 
lending to the financial sector is not included, particularly inter-bank loans, nor are loans to the 
public sector. Total claims are obtained as the sum of local lending in foreign and domestic 
currency and cross-border lending in both types of currencies.  
· MPdomestict-k is the change in domestic monetary policy at time t-k and has only time 
variation. We include the contemporaneous value and three lagged quarters of the change in the 
monetary measure in the regression, as monetary policy may affect banks with a lag (so k goes from 
0 to 3). Our main interest is the sign and statistical significance of the cumulative and impact effect of 
domestic monetary policy. We capture the stance of monetary policy with two variables, given that 
the period covers the years when the central bank followed unconventional approaches. The first 
one is the European Central Bank refinancing rate. The second one is the shadow rate defined in 
Krippner (2013, 2015), which allows to capture the effects of monetary policies at the Zero Lower 
Bound on the portfolio composition of banks and other financial institutions. 
We include four main sets of control variables: individual bank variables, home country 
control variable, host country control variables and international market indicators. These 
variables enter the regression lagged one period. Xb, t-1 is a vector of time-varying bank control 
variables. These include bank’s size as captured by the log of total assets (log total assets), the 
unweighted capital ratio, i.e capital divided by total assets, without any risk weighting (Tier1 
ratio) 6, its liquidity ratio (liquid asset ratio) and core deposit ratio (core deposits ratio), measured 
                                                                          
6 For confidentiality reasons, we do not have access to own resources data and requirements on own resources.  
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by core deposits over total assets. Z t -1 includes counterparty country specific demand factors 
also lagged 1 period. In particular, the control variables for the business cycle is the output gap 
(BIS, 2014) (business cyclej) and for the financial cycle is the credit to GDP gap (Drehmann et al 
(2011) as updated by the BIS (financial cyclej). We also include the counterparty monetary 
policy stance as captured by the change in the relevant short term policy rate. Zdomestic t-1 
includes Spanish specific supply factors. In particular, as for counterparty countries, the control 
variables for the business cycle is the output gap (BIS, 2014) (business cycle domestic) and for 
the financial cycle is the credit to GDP gap (Drehmann et al (2011) as updated by the BIS 
(financial cycle domestic). Finally, we include VIX to control for international market conditions. 
Buch et al (2018) describe in detail the rationale behind each explanatory variable. 
We estimate the unbalanced panel data with OLS and include destination-country 
fixed effects and bank fixed effects. The number of banks that operate in each country is rather 
limited, as banks’ heterogeneity in the destination of foreign activity is rather broad. The largest 
banks which are those that operate through subsidiaries tend to have a broader country 
coverage. Small banks are active in much less countries at a time. It is thus not possible to 
control for country-time effects, so that we do not include them. t ratios are clustered by bank 
and we report the corresponding p-values.  
We explore bank-level characteristics to analyze the mechanisms of monetary policy 
transmission and the different channels discussed in the literature. Bank heterogeneity captures 
funding and portfolio frictions (Buch et al. 2018, Barbosa et al. 2018), as reflected in the capital 
and liquidity position of individual banks, access to different types of funding such as through 
the wholesale market, availability of collateral, or access to an internationally active banking 
network, that may influence how monetary policy impacts bank lending (domestic or cross-
border). We run regressions where the friction that banks are facing and that relate to 
traditional channels of transmission interacts with the monetary policy variable, so that their 
general expression is:  
οܻܾǡ݆ǡݐ ൌ ߙͲ ൅ σ ߙͳǡ݇͵݇ൌͲ οܯܲݐെ݇݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ ൅ σ ߙʹǡ݇͵݇ൌͲ οܯܲݐെ݇݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ כ ܨݎ݅ܿݐ݅݋ܾ݊ǡݐെͶ ൅
ߙ͵ܨݎ݅ܿݐ݅݋ܾ݊ǡݐെ݇ ൅ ߙͶܾܺǡݐെͳ ൅ ߙͷܼ௧ିଵ
݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ ൅ ߙ͸ܼ݆ǡݐെͳ ൅ ߙ͹ܸܫܺݐെͳ ൅ ݂ܾ ൅ ݂݆ ൅ ߝܾǡ݆ǡݐ    (2) 
The new variable Friction b,j,t-k-1 proxies the funding and portfolio frictions that lead to 
the channels of transmission of monetary policy and enter the regression at the fourth lag to 
ensure that they are not affected by monetary policy changes from t to t-3.  The Friction 
variable is, in general, bank-time-specific, but has no counterparty country dimension. 
We distinguish two main international bank-based transmission channels. The bank-
lending channel and the portfolio channel, which give rise to opposite reactions from banks. 
The bank lending channel operates through the liability side as follows: a bank operating in a 
country where a contractionary monetary shock takes place, reduces its reserves and its 
deposits. As long as there is no perfect substitutability of retail bank deposits with other 
sources of funds or banks are not able to obtain other sources of financing, the bank could 
transmit the shock cross-border and reduce external loans. As this channel works by changing 
the short-term funding rate paid by banks or by affecting liquidity constraints, we use variables 
that capture frictions related to the different sources of bank’s funding such as the wholesale 
financing ratio (wholesale ratio), calculated as the non-deposit funding over total liabilities, the 
liquidity ratio (liquid asset ratio), defined as the ratio of cash and central bank deposits over 
total assets, that tries to capture the possibility of liquidity shortages, which could precede 
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solvency problems, and the bank size proxied by the ln of total assets (log total assets), as 
larger banks may be able to fund themselves at cheaper rates (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). As 
for the portfolio rebalancing channel, which changes the composition but not the size of banks’ 
balance, it operates as follows: a tightening of monetary policy reduces the creditworthiness of 
domestic borrowers in relation to foreign ones, as the value of the collateral declines. This 
prompts banks to substitute away from domestic credit and toward foreign credit to safer 
locations and borrower types, leading to an increase in bank lending abroad (Correa et al., 
2015). As this channel operates through the change in the risk structure and composition of 
bank’s assets, we use variables that may capture these portfolio frictions. In particular, we 
include the capital ratio (Tier 1 ratio), which not only provides a good proxy of the capital 
restrictions that a bank may face, but it will determine the types of assets that the bank can 
purchase, the proportion of private loans over total assets (private loans/total assets), which 
proxies the most traditional activities in the bank’s balance sheet, the proportion of net 
securities over total assets (securities/total assets) as a proxy of portfolio management, and the 
international bank activity calculated as the ratio of total claims on foreign borrowers over total 
assets (foreign loans/total loans) which provides a proxy of the weight that international activity 
has on bank’s portfolio.  
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4 Outward transmission of monetary policy to non-financial private sector 
 by currency denomination 
We are interested in assessing direct real economic effects. Therefore, we first carry out the 
analysis of the impact of monetary policy on foreign lending, but limiting it to the non-financial 
private sector, whether cross-border or local, distinguishing between those denominated in 
local and foreign currency. We present the results obtained for the two friction types (funding 
and portfolio) in Tables 1 to 4.  Tables 1 and 2 record the results with claims denominated in 
local currency and Tables 3 and 4 present the results for claims in foreign currency. We present 
the cumulative effects for monetary policy (ɇƄMP Domestic_t to t-3), the interaction effect of 
monetary policy and the proxy for the friction effect (ɇƄMP Domestic_t to t-3*Friction_t-4) and the 
Total effect of both factors for the median bank (Total effect of ɇƄMP terms for median bank), 
as a means to show the economic impact. We also include in the last three rows of results, the 
short-run estimated coefficients for these variables.  
These regressions show that monetary policy does not directly affect private lending 
abroad in local currency for the median bank (Tables 1 and 2). Neither the cumulative nor the 
sort-term effect are statistically significant. The exception is the negative impact captured when 
no friction is analysed and the positive impact obtained when the total assets friction is 
analysed. This lack of statistical significance is not maintained when we look at private claims 
denominated in foreign currency. As reflected in Tables 3 and 4, we find instead that the ECB 
monetary policy affects private lending in foreign currency for the median bank, with a positive 
sign in the long run. Therefore, more restrictive monetary policy in the home country leads to 
increased lending to the private sector abroad in foreign currency, so that Spanish banking 
groups engage in portfolio rebalancing or increase their portfolio towards foreign activity 
denominated in foreign currency. The transmission seems to be affected by both funding and 
portfolio frictions. For the funding frictions, we find that the median Spanish bank in terms of 
wholesale funding ratio and liquidity ratio increase their private claims abroad in response to a 
tightening of monetary policy at home. For the portfolio frictions, we obtain that median 
Spanish bank in terms of capital ratio and in the proportion of securities in relation to total 
assets also increase their private claims abroad in response to a tightening of monetary policy 
at home. We also find that the higher the proportion of loans in relation to assets, the lower the 
positive effect of monetary policy and that a higher presence abroad tend to reinforce the 
positive effect of a tightening of monetary policy on foreign claims in foreign currency. In the 
short run, we do not find evidence of any impact of monetary policy on private claims 
denominated in foreign currency.  
We also carry out a more direct test of the relevance of currency denomination for 
the outward transmission of monetary policy. Table 5 shows the regression results where we 
take directly the weight of local currency denomination into account. We interact the 
changes in monetary policy with the weight of claims denominated in local currency, and 
present the results corresponding to the 25%, 50% and 75% percentile level of the variable 
that measures the weight that local currency has on total claims. In columns 1 and 2 the 
dependent variable is changes in non-bank private claims and in columns 3 and 4 the 
dependent variable is total claims, which we will refer to in section 5. We use as measures of 
monetary policy the changes in the nominal policy rates in columns 1 and 3 and the changes 
in the shadow rate in columns 2 and 4. The results point at a declining impact of monetary 
policy as the weight of non-bank private claims denominated in local currency increases. In 
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particular, an increase from 54% to 100% of claims in local currency, would reduce the 
transmission effect between 0.0051 and 0.0362 points. 
Therefore, the evidence gathered points at a differential impact of home monetary 
policy on foreign claims depending on the currency. In general, we find spillover effects for 
claims denominated in foreign currency, whose transmission depends on the type of friction, 
and which take place in the long run, while in the short run, there is no impact.  For claims in 
local currency, we find some short term impact, which fades away in the long run. The 
proportion of loans and the proportion of securities are the only frictions of transmission of 
home monetary policy into foreign claims in local currency, which seem to be statistically 
significant and which have the same qualitative effect than those in foreign currency. 
As for individual’s bank determinants, we do not find evidence that the size of a bank 
affects changes in lending abroad. We find evidence that the higher the liquidity ratio the more 
rapidly the expansion of total and cross-border credit. Among country controls, we find that 
Spanish banks reduce their foreign lending denominated in foreign currency during real sector 
expansions, while the financial cycle has a positive impact, especially for lending in local 
currency. Moreover, neither the business nor the financial cycle of the counterparty country 
affect the change in private lending abroad. All the effect of the counterparty economy is 
channelled through host monetary policy. For the funding frictions associated to the bank 
lending channel in local currency we obtain a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
host monetary policy. Therefore, a tightening of monetary policy in the host country results in a 
contraction of credit provided by Spanish banks in local currency. However, for foreign 
currency and especially under the frictonsd of the portfolio channel, we find evidence that the 
effect is positive, so that more restrictive monetary policy in the host country results in an 
increase of foreign claims denominated in foreign currency.  
4.1 Distinguishing between types of claims  
 
We have just gathered evidence that lending in local currency was less affected by the ECB 
monetary policy than lending in foreign-denominated currency and as most local activity is 
carried out in local currency (84.7% on average) it is worth exploring if it is mostly the type of 
activity and not the currency that drives the results. To do so, we run regressions where the 
dependent variable is either the local lending in local currency (Table 6) or the local lending 
denominated in foreign currency (Table 7). If it is the currency which drives the results we would 
expect that local claims in local currency do not respond to change in the monetary policy 
stance while local claims in foreign currency do. We only report the values and p-values of the 
estimated coefficients of the monetary policy variables. 
The results for local claims in local currency are aligned with the general results by 
currency: we do not find evidence that claims in local currency of Spanish banking groups are 
affected by the ECB monetary policy. This general result has two exceptions: the cumulative 
effect of a tightening of monetary policy in local non-bank private claims in local currency is 
mitigated by higher liquidity and higher weight of foreign borrowers. In the short term, larger 
banks, or with a higher proportion of loans or a higher weight of foreign borrowers mitigate the 
monetary policy impact (Table 6). As for local lending denominated in foreign currency, the 
results in Table 7 show that it does not respond to the monetary policy stance in the home 
country, neither in the short nor the long run, in contrast to the general results by currency. The 
only exception is when the bank lending channel is proxied through Tier 1 ratio. In this case, 
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local claims in foreign currency decline with a monetary policy contraction in the home country, 
but banks with higher solvency mitigate such decline.  
Therefore, we do not find evidence, again, that monetary policy in transmitted abroad 
to claims in local currency, with a few exceptions. However, we cannot find evidence that there 
is transmission if local claims are denominated in foreign currency. There are practically no 
differences in the spillover effects of monetary policy on local claims depending on the 
currency, so that local claims are, in general, isolated from spillovers of domestic monetary 
policy, independently of the currency in which lending is carried out. 
We also explore in the case of cross-border claims whether the choice of currency 
makes monetary policy in the home country have a different impact. In this case, nearly half of 
the cross-border activity is, on average, carried out in local currency.  
We gather evidence that, only in the short term, a tightening of monetary policy in the 
home country reduces cross-border lending in local currency, mainly when we consider 
portfolio frictions (Table 8). Such effect is not statistically significant in the long term except 
when we use the ratio of securities over total assets. The short-term impact is positive when 
we consider funding frictions as captured by the log of total assets. In fact, the cumulative 
effect is also positive, so that banks with larger assets increase cross-border lending in local 
currency in the face of a tightening of monetary policy. The results in Table 9 for cross-border 
claims denominated in foreign currency show that both types of frictions affect the transmission 
of monetary policy. For funding frictions, we find evidence that the median bank in terms of 
wholesale funding and liquidity ratio increase their cross-border claims in foreign currency when 
monetary policy in the home country tightens, a result also obtained under the portfolio channel 
for the median bank in terms of ratio of securities. We also obtain that banks with lower ratio of 
loans over assets, higher ratio of securities over assets and higher ratio of foreign assets 
increase their cross-border claims in foreign currency in response to a tightening of monetary 
policy at home. 
Again, we gather evidence that currency matters for monetary policy transmission. 
Cross-border claims denominated in local currency are less affected by monetary policy than if 
these claims are denominated in foreign currency. A major difference is the effect in the short 
term, which is statistically significant for local currency, implying that a tightening of monetary 
policy results in a reduction in cross-border claims denominated in local currency, but the 
effect fades away in the long run.   
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1827
5 Total foreign claims by currency denomination 
We next explore the effects of monetary policy and the different potential channels of its 
transmission on total foreign claims, instead of only on non-financial private claims. The 
spillovers may differ if claims to the public and the financial sector are also included in the 
analysis, as their determinants do not necessarily be the same. In particular, private non-
finance claims account for 50% of total foreign claims of the overall system. They also account 
for 48% of total claims denominated in foreign currency and 55% of those denominated in local 
currency. The average weight by bank of total local claims (10.39%) is slightly lower than for 
private local claims (12.13%), but the average weight of claims in local currency is slightly 
higher (25.1 versus 23.4%).  
The results, obtained following the specifications recorded in Tables 1 to 4, are 
summarized in Table 10 for lending denominated in local currency and in Table 11 for lending in 
foreign currency. We only report the values and p-values of the estimated coefficients of the 
monetary policy variables, both the cumulative and the short-run effect. 
As in the case of non-bank private lending denominated in local currency, we do not 
find evidence that the median bank changes its total lending abroad in local currency as a 
result of a change in monetary policy in the home country, whatever the friction. In particular, 
we do not find evidence that funding frictions are relevant when assessing the cumulative effect 
of MP effect on total claims in local currency. We do, however, find that the short term impact 
is negative, with the wholesale funding ratio and the log of total assets mitigating this effect. 
The only exception to this negative short term impact is when assessing the role of tier 1 
capital, as we find that, in the short run, the median bank reduces its total lending abroad 
denominated in local currency as a consequence of a tightening of monetary policy in the 
home country. We also find evidence that portfolio frictions may be relevant for the 
transmission of monetary policy to total lending abroad in local currency. The tightening of 
monetary policy by the ECB results in an increase in total claims abroad in local currency, 
which is mitigated by higher solvency and higher proportion of loans on total assets. Bank-
specific heterogeneity affects how monetary policy transmits into lending in local currency.  
The results differ completely when we refer to total claims denominated in foreign 
currency. We gather evidence that the median bank increases its total lending abroad in foreign 
currency when there is a tightening of monetary policy in the home country. Contrary to our 
findings for local currency, in the short run, there is no impact and we cannot find evidence that 
the different channels and variables affect the transmission of monetary policy to total lending 
abroad in foreign currency, neither in the short nor in the long run. Bank heterogeneity does not 
seem to play a role in the transmission. 
As we did before for private claims, we also test directly whether the weight of the 
currency denomination is relevant for the outward transmission of monetary policy. Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 5 show the regression results when we interact the changes in monetary policy 
with the weight of total claims denominated in local currency, and present the results 
corresponding to the 25%, 50% and 75% percentile level of the variable that measures the 
weight that local currency has on total claims. They point at a declining transmission of the 
positive effect of monetary policy on total claims abroad as the weight of claims denominated 
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in local currency increases. In particular, an increase from 54% to 100% of claims in local 
currency, would reduce the transmission effect between 0.0051 and 0.0075 points. 
Therefore, the results point at differences in the transmission of monetary policy 
through total lending to all sectors abroad depending on the currency. They also point at 
differences between lending to the private sector and lending to the whole economy. In 
general, we find evidence of frictions affecting the transmission to total lending and not so 
much to private lending.   
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1827
6 Direct role of the exchange rate  
In the business model of the Spanish banking system, the funding raised by internationally 
active banks is mostly denominated in the same currency than the assets that the banks intend 
to fund: the local currency. However, there is still some currency mismatch that may be fully 
hedged by banks. Costly access to foreign exchange hedging could diminish the returns on 
lending in foreign markets (Bräuning and Ivashina, 2017). Therefore, we propose controlling for 
exchange rate effects, as exchange rate fluctuations may have a direct impact on the lending of 
internationally active banks, beyond the change in the value of the exposure, which will show 
when we distinguish by currency7 (Takats et al 2016, 2016b).  
On the one hand, we include the euro-local exchange rate change (tcj) so that a 
positive value indicates a depreciation of the local currency. Given that bank’s results may be 
relevant for shareholders also at the consolidated level and that a depreciation in local currency 
would reduce the value of the benefits which the group obtains in that country, and not only 
the value of the affiliate, exchange rate changes may affect the decision to lend to that country. 
We also include the US dollar-euro exchange rate change (tc_$US), as, although Spanish 
multinational banks fund themselves mostly locally in the counterparty country, as shown in 
Figure 1, global banks tend to fund themselves in the US money market funds. In particular, 
European banks borrowed heavily in US dollar currency, especially before the financial crisis. A 
positive value of tc_$US indicates a USD depreciation8, so that a positive estimated coefficient 
would imply that a USD depreciation leads to increases in lending to other countries. Finally, 
the cross-border transmission of the ECB monetary policy may depend on the relevance of 
euro currency for the transactions of the bank in the counterparty country. Using 
unconsolidated data (the so-called Locational Banking Statistics (BIS,2015)), which include 
intragroup positions between offices of the same banking group, we compute the proportion of 
credits in euros in relation to all positions that the bank has in the counterparty country (weuroj)9 
to proxy the relevance of euro currency for the bank in the host country. 
 
 
                                                                          
7 On the other hand, monetary policy may affect the exchange rate. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) found that a 
contractionary shock to US monetary policy leads to persistent appreciation in the USD, with an impact that occurs 
several months after the shock. Bruno and Shin (2015) find evidence of monetary policy spillovers on cross-border bank 
capital flows and the US dollar exchange rate through the banking sector. Specifically, they find that a decline in the Fed 
funds rate leads to a depreciation in the US dollar after about 14 quarters and eventually to an increase in the capital 
flows funded by the US dollar. 
8 We have also tried with the inclusion of the US$-local currency exchange rate change, but it was not statistically 
significant. 
9 We have included a multiplicative variable of the the weight of euro assets and monetary policy, but it was not 
statistically significant. We have considered the potential role that US monetary policy and the alignment of the ECB and 
the FED monetary policy stance might have played. So we have run additional regressions where we have included the 
change in the US effective federal funds rate (·MPUS) and the multiplicative value of the euro and the US monetary 
policy variables, to test for the relevance of equal or diverging stance of monetary policy between the FED and the ECB, 
excluding the US as a counterparty country. Overall, the results for the spillover effects of the ECB MP do not 
qualitatively change. A tightening of US monetary policy results in increases in lending denominated in foreign currency 
and in declines or no effects in local currency lending. The alignment of the monetary policy stance between the US and 
the Eurozone either results in higher lending or has no effect.
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Table 12 summarizes the results for lending in local currency and Table 13 for lending 
in foreign currency to the private non-bank sector10. We only report the values and p-values of 
the estimated coefficients of the cumulative effect of the monetary policy variables and of the 
three new regressors: tc_$US, tc_j and weuroj. 
The results recorded in Table 12 point at non statistically significant effect of a change 
in the ECB´s policy rate on the log change in total (cross-border and local) claims to the non-
financial private sector in local currency. So the inclusion of these new control variables does 
not alter the qualitative results presented in the previous section: changes in the ECB monetary 
policy stance does not seem to affect the local currency exposures to countries outside the 
euro area.  
The weight of the claims in euros to the different counterparty countries has a positive 
effect on the change in local currency lending to that country. This result could indicate some 
level of complementarity between lending in local or in euros for the bank. The coefficients for 
the local currency and for the $US exchange rate changes are not statistically significant.  
Therefore, when the euro appreciates either in relation to the local currency of the counterparty 
country or in relation to the $US, there is no change in local currency exposures to the private 
non-bank sector. These findings are in line with expectations given the predominant business 
model for the internationalization of Spanish banks. 
The results recorded in Table 13 for the exposures in foreign currency point at a 
different effect of monetary policy in comparison to local currency claims. They suggest a 
positive and statistically significant effect of a change in the ECB´s policy rate on the log change 
in total (cross-border and local) claims to the non-financial private sector in foreign currency. So 
a tightening of ECB monetary policy results in an increase in the non-local currency exposures 
to countries outside the euro area. So, again, the inclusion of these new control variables does 
not alter the qualitative results presented in the previous section. 
The results for claims in foreign currency also differ from those in local currency as 
regards the new variables and are aligned with those in Takats el al 2016, 2016b, obtained with 
aggregate data. The weight of the claims in euros to the different counterparty countries has a 
negative effect on the change in foreign lending. So, in this case, the euro may be playing a 
substitute role in the lending in foreign currency, in relation, probably to the $US. The 
coefficients for the exchange rate changes are statistically significant and positive for the local 
currency depreciation and negative for the $US depreciation.  Therefore, when the euro 
appreciates in relation to the local currency of a given country, there is a decline in the non-
local currency exposures to the private sector of that country. This may be the consequence of 
a higher exchange rate hedging cost. When the appreciation is in relation to the $US, which 
can act as a wholesale market for funds, there is an increase in this type of exposures11.When 
banks do some of their business in dollars, lending terms in dollar-denominated credit markets 
will be affected by shocks such as those in the exchange rate. 
                                                                          
10 We have also estimated the equations distinguishing between cross-border and local exposures, with similar 
qualitative results: the inclusion of these additional explanatory variables does not affect the results obtained in relation 
to the spillover effects of monetary policy and the relevance of the different frictions. 
11 We have also estimated the equation excluding the US, with the same qualitative results.  
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7 Summary and concluding remarks 
The evidence we have gathered so far indicates that changes in lender-country policy 
interest rates are transmitted to borrower countries as shocks to credit supply volumes, 
depending on the currency-denomination of the claim, and to a lesser extent, but also, on 
the type of claim (local or cross-border). We find evidence that the cross-border transmission 
of monetary policy to the real sector takes place, mostly, through cross-border claims 
denominated in foreign currency. When total activity is considered (including claims to the 
public and the financial sector) we find that there is transmission to the median bank only in 
foreign currency, but there is also some impact in local currency mostly in the short term and 
when portfolio frictions are considered.  
In particular, we find empirical evidence that a monetary policy contraction in the euro 
zone results in higher Spanish banks’ lending to the non-financial private sector denominated in 
foreign currency in countries abroad within a year period. The impact of monetary policy takes 
place mostly through cross-border lending, as local lending, either in foreign or local currency 
is, in general, not affected by home monetary policy. However, in the short-term, the impact is 
also positive for cross-border claims in local currency. The most prevalent forms of bank 
heterogeneity that matter for differential lending responses by banks are linked to portfolio 
frictions and include the solvency ratio, the ratio of securities and the ratio of private loans 
relative to banks’ total assets. For total claims, we find that the heterogeneity of banks matter 
for the cross-border transmission of monetary policy in local currency in the long run.  
Moreover, the short run impact for total claims denominated in local currency is negative, so 
that a tightening of ECB monetary policy results in a contraction of claims abroad denominated 
in local currency. For total claims in foreign currency, banks’ heterogeneity does not seem to 
influence the positive effect that a contractionary monetary policy has on them. 
As for the role played by exchange rate changes our findings point out at great 
differences depending on the currency-denomination of the loan. Overall, our results indicate 
that neither the local currency/euro nor the $US/ euro exchange rate are relevant for loans 
denominated in local currency, but they affect loans denominated in foreign currency. In 
particular, a cheaper dollar in relation to the euro would result in an increase in foreign currency 
exposures, a finding that is in line with analysis carried out with aggregate data (Bruno and 
Shin, 2015, Takats and Temesvary, 2016, Avdjiev and Takats, 2016).  
The results obtained are aligned with previous findings that cross-border bank lending 
is a major channel of monetary policy transmission (Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) and 
Temesvary et al (2016)). They are also aligned with previous work showing the relevance of 
currency denomination for the cross-border transmission of monetary policy (Takats and 
Temesvary, 2016; Avdjiev and Takats, 2016, Avdjiev et al, 2018; Ivashina et al., 2015) and of 
the role of exchange rate (Avdjiev and Takats, 2016) . They add to the currency dimension the 
relevance of the counterparty country and its local currency. 
As we observe that global banks are reducing their cross border activity and tend to 
focus their foreign activity in local claims, we can expect that the spillovers from home-country 
monetary policy would not be large. Policymakers should be concerned about the spillovers of 
monetary policy mostly when claims are in foreign currency.  
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  ;Ϭ͘ϬϴϳϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϯϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϲϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϮϳͿ
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǇĐůĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϵϰϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϱϮϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϰϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϯϳ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϰϭ
 ;Ϭ͘ϲϴϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϬϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϮϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϮͿ
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǇĐůĞͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϭϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϳϱϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϳϴϳ Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϱϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϵϯϲ
 ;Ϭ͘ϰϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϬϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϰϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϯͿ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǇĐůĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϳϮΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϵϯΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϲϰ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϵϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϲϯΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϮϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϳϮͿ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǇĐůĞͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϲϳ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϮϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϭϯϴ ϰ͘ϬϭĞͲϬϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϯϭ
 ;Ϭ͘ϳϲϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϳϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϲϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϳϲͿ
ȴDWͺũ͕ƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϱϲ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϭϯ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϭϴ Ϭ͘ϬϭϲϬ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϮϵ
 ;Ϭ͘ϴϳϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϮϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϬϴͿ
s/yͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϲϲϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϯϳ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϱϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϲϵ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϬϴ
 ;Ϭ͘ϮϰϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϱϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϭϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϵϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϯϵͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ ͲϬ͘ϬϵϬϮ ͲϬ͘Ϭϲϲϵ ͲϬ͘ϭϵϮ ͲϬ͘Ϯϵϲ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϱϵ
 ;Ϭ͘ϭϱϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϳϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϱϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϱϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϭϵͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϵϯϳ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϰϮ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϭϴ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϰϰϮΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϳϱϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϰϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϬϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϬϴͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDW
ŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ
 ͲϬ͘ϬϳϲϮ ͲϬ͘ϭϵϭ ͲϬ͘Ϯϴϰ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϭϱ
  ;Ϭ͘ϱϲϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϰϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϰϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϲϲͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV     
5VTXDUHG     
$GMXVWHG5VTXDUHG     
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH
)ULFWLRQ6WXGLHG 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR
;ϭͿ^ĞĞdĂďůĞϭĨŽƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͘













ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ Ϭ͘ϭϲϲΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϳϴϬ Ϭ͘ϭϮϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϰϯ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϳϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϱϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϰϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϬͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϯϱ Ϭ͘Ϭϰϯϵ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϲϳ
  ;Ϭ͘ϮϵϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϬϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϲϵͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  Ϭ͘ϭϰϰΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϴϰΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϴϮ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϵϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϴϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϴͿ
>ŽŐƚŽƚĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϭϰ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϲϲ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϯϰ 
;Ϭ͘ϰϰϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϵϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϱϬͿ 
dŝĞƌϭZĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϭϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϵϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϵϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϰϳ
;Ϭ͘ϱϬϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϮϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϲϲͿ
>ŝƋƵŝĚĂƐƐĞƚƌĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϲϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϳϯ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϵϰ
;Ϭ͘ϳϲϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϱϬͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϵϰϲͿ
ŽƌĞĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐƌĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϬϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϴϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϭϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϮϭ
;Ϭ͘ϭϰϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϴϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϱϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϮϰͿ
&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϳϯ Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϯΎ ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϭϳ
 ;Ϭ͘ϱϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϬϬͿ
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǇĐůĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϮϭΎΎ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϱϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϲϬ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϲϵΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϱϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϴϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϱϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϭϲͿ
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǇĐůĞͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϬϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϬϬ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϯϮ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϰϭ
 ;Ϭ͘ϯϴϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϰϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϰϮͿ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǇĐůĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϭϴΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϳϯϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϭϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϵϭϳ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϬϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϰϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϴϳͿ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǇĐůĞͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϰϮ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϭϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϰϰ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϲϳ
 ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϯϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϬϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϮϱͿ
ȴDWͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϯΎ Ϭ͘ϬϮϬϯ Ϭ͘ϬϭϵϮ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϵϰ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϮϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϯϮͿ
s/yͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϬϲΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϴϯΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϰϰΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϱϮΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϳϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϵϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϴϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϰϱϭͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ Ϭ͘ϬϬϴϵϴ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϭϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϵϭϳ ͲϬ͘ϭϳϯ
 ;Ϭ͘ϳϱϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϯϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϬϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϯϭͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϲϵ Ϭ͘ϬϮϵϵ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϲϯ
 ;Ϭ͘ϱϭϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϰϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϲͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϵϱϴ Ϭ͘ϬϮϬϳ ͲϬ͘ϭϱϳ
 ;Ϭ͘ϵϰϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϰϯͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV    
5VTXDUHG    
$GMXVWHG5VTXDUHG    
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH
)ULFWLRQ6WXGLHG )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ
;ϭͿ^ĞĞdĂďůĞϭĨŽƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͘
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ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ Ϭ͘ϬϴϭϲΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϮϳ Ϭ͘ϳϴϬΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϰϳϮ Ϭ͘Ϭϰϴϰ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϲϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϱϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϬϬͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϱϲ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϬϱΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϭϲΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϳϮΎΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϴϴϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϴϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϭϱͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  Ϭ͘ϭϭϯΎΎ Ϭ͘Ϭϰϰϭ Ϭ͘ϭϭϳΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϱϮϰ
  ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϴϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϲϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϱϯͿ
>ŽŐƚŽƚĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϱϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϲϮϭ ͲϬ͘Ϭϵϭϱ ͲϬ͘ϬϴϵϬ ͲϬ͘ϬϰϲϮ
 ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϭϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϬϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϯϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϵϭͿ
dŝĞƌϭZĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϯϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϰϴ Ͳϰ͘ϴϲĞͲϬϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϵϬ
 ;Ϭ͘ϰϯϴͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϴϴϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϬϬͿ
>ŝƋƵŝĚĂƐƐĞƚƌĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϬϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϰϮ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϵϮ ͲϮ͘ϴϯĞͲϬϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϮϵ
 ;Ϭ͘ϴϰϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϳϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϳϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϭϯͿ
ŽƌĞĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐƌĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϮϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϵϭϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϵϴϵ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϬϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϮϭ
 ;Ϭ͘ϮϯϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϭϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϳϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϱͿ
&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϭϰϮ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϳϴϱ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϯϯϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϰϲϭ
  ;Ϭ͘ϰϬϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϭϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϬϭͿ
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǇĐůĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϰϴΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϲϲϵ Ͳϴ͘ϲϰĞͲϬϱ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϵϵ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϲϭϴ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϬϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϬϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϭϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϬϵͿ
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǇĐůĞͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϮϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϳϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϴϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϰϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϭϳ
 ;Ϭ͘ϭϭϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϭϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϭϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϲϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϳϯͿ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǇĐůĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϴϴΎ ͲϮ͘ϴϯĞͲϬϲ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϱϯϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϯϱϮ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϳϴ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϭϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϱϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϵϭͿ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǇĐůĞͺũ͕ƚͲϭ ϯ͘ϴϳĞͲϬϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϴϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϳϱ Ͳϰ͘ϭϯĞͲϬϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϰϬ
 ;Ϭ͘ϵϰϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϰϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϰϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϮϮͿ
ȴDWͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϳΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϰΎ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϰϲ Ϭ͘ϬϭϱϴΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϲϴΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϴϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϲϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϬϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϲϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϯϯͿ
s/yͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϭϮ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϵϯΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϭϬ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϱϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϱϬ
 ;Ϭ͘ϮϭϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϯϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϭϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϬϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϵϴͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴϵϭ Ϭ͘Ϭϯϭϰ Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϰ Ϭ͘ϬϲϬϬ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϵϵ
 ;Ϭ͘ϱϮϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϯϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϬϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϰϵͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϲϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϯϴ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϴϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϰϱΎΎΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϲϴϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϭϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϰϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϵϬͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDW
ŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ
 Ϭ͘ϬϮϴϴ Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϱ Ϭ͘ϬϱϳϮ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϴϱ
  Ϭ͘ϰϬϳ Ϭ͘ϴϵϳ Ϭ͘ϭϲϭ Ϭ͘ϯϴϬ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV     
5VTXDUHG     
$GMXVWHG5VTXDUHG     
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH
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ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ Ϭ͘ϬϱϲϬ Ϭ͘ϬϮϱϮ Ϭ͘ϬϴϲϳΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϰϲϭΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϱϱͿ ;ϭ͘ϮϰĞͲϬϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϳϴͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϭϲϵ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϭϭϳ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϰϭϴ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϯϭϰ
 ;Ϭ͘ϱϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϳϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϮͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌϮϱйďĂŶŬ Ϭ͘ϬϰϲϲΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϴϲΎ Ϭ͘ϬϲϰϬΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϮϵϭΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϵϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϰϯϳͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ Ϭ͘ϬϰϯϵΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϲϴΎ Ϭ͘ϬϱϳϬΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϮϯϵ
;Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϯϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϬϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϭϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϭϳͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌϳϱйďĂŶŬ Ϭ͘ϬϯϵϭΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϯϱΎ Ϭ͘ϬϰϰϵΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϴΎΎ
;Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϵϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϰϯϳͿ
>ŽŐƚŽƚĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϭϬ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϯϴ Ͳϵ͘ϲϮĞͲϬϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϴϳ
;Ϭ͘ϰϴϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϴϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϭϬͿ
dŝĞƌϭZĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϬϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϳϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϴϱϯΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϵϱϭΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϯϰϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϵϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϴϳͿ
>ŝƋƵŝĚĂƐƐĞƚƌĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϰϲΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϳϬϯΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϱϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϯϯ
;Ϭ͘ϬϬϴϭϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϬϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϵϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϱϬͿ
ŽƌĞĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐƌĂƚŝŽͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϵϲϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϲϬϰ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϳϮ Ͳϴ͘ϴϱĞͲϬϱ
;Ϭ͘ϮϴϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϱϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϭϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϱϳͿ
&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ ϱ͘ϯϬĞͲϬϱ ϱ͘ϮϬĞͲϬϱ ϳ͘ϵϵĞͲϬϱ ϲ͘ϳϳĞͲϬϱ
;Ϭ͘ϯϭϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϵϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϮϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϴϴͿ
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǇĐůĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴϬϲΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϲϬϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϮϴΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϯϳΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϲϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϰϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϳϵϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϱϲͿ
ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǇĐůĞͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϴϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϴϬΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϴϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϰϳ
 ;Ϭ͘ϭϴϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϳϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϭϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϴϯͿ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǇĐůĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϮϮΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϭϯΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϮϮΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϰϬΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϵϵϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϲϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϰϲϳͿ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǇĐůĞͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϰϵϯΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϰϰϯΎΎ Ͳϵ͘ϭϵĞͲϬϱ Ͳϴ͘ϮϵĞͲϬϱ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϯϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϰϵϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϵϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϭϮͿ
ȴDWͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϵϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϯϱ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϯϵ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϳϬ
 ;Ϭ͘ϯϵϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϴϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϴϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϵϮͿ
s/yͺƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϯϵ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϰϲΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϯϳϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϭϳΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϭϬϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϱϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϴϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϮϭͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϮϬ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϱϰΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϯϲ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϰϳ
 ;Ϭ͘ϮϲϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϬϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϯϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϬͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ Ͳϴ͘ϰϭĞͲϬϱ ϴ͘ϵϰĞͲϬϱ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϮϭϰ Ͳϴ͘ϳϯĞͲϬϱ
;Ϭ͘ϴϬϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϴϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϬϯͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϮϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϱϯΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϭϱ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϰϳ
;Ϭ͘ϮϱϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϵͿ Ϭ͘ϴϯϴ Ϭ͘ϭϱϭ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV    
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ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ ͲϬ͘ϭϴϭ Ϭ͘Ϭϴϲϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϰϳ Ϭ͘ϰϬϭ  ͲϬ͘Ϯϱϱ ͲϬ͘Ϯϴϴ ͲϬ͘ϯϯϰ ͲϬ͘ϲϬϴ Ϭ͘Ϯϱϱ
 ;Ϭ͘ϯϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϴϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϰϬͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϯϱϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϭϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϮϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϰͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϰϵϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϱϮϴΎ ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϲϵ   Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϮϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϰϵ Ϭ͘ϬϮϯϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϰϰΎΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϯϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϬϱͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϯϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϭϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϵϭͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  ͲϬ͘ϬϴϲϮ ͲϬ͘ϭϬϬ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϯϴ   ͲϬ͘ϮϴϬ ͲϬ͘ϮϯϬ ͲϬ͘ϮϴϬ Ϭ͘Ϯϯϰ
  ;Ϭ͘ϳϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϴϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϭͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϯϮϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϭϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϱϬͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ ͲϬ͘ϭϳϵ ͲϬ͘Ϭϴϭϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϯϯϱ ϭ͘ϯϰϮΎΎΎ  ͲϬ͘ϭϰϳ ͲϬ͘ϮϬϱ Ϭ͘ϭϯϲ ͲϬ͘ϰϮϲ Ϭ͘ϭϱϵ
 ;Ϭ͘ϭϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϱϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϴϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϵϴϱͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϮϬϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϴϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϰϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϭϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϯϭͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϵϬϴ ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϯϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϵϳϯΎΎΎ   Ϭ͘ϬϭϮϳ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϰϱϲΎ Ϭ͘ϬϮϬϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴϬϴΎΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϵϮϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϵϲͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϲϳϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϳϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϲϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϮϰͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϴϮϯ ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϲϳ ϭ͘ϮϰϱΎΎ   ͲϬ͘ϭϵϮ Ϭ͘ϭϯϮ ͲϬ͘ϰϬϲ Ϭ͘ϭϱϭ
  ;Ϭ͘ϴϰϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϳϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϮͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϮϱϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϰϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϬϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϰϱͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV          
5VTXDUHG          
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH  6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH
)ULFWLRQ6WXGLHG )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ  3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR
;ϭͿ^ĞĞdĂďůĞϭĨŽƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
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ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϯϮϯ ͲϬ͘Ϯϱϰ Ϭ͘ϬϴϬϵ ͲϬ͘ϲϮϴ  ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϵϴ ͲϬ͘ϮϮϱΎ ͲϬ͘ϭϲϭ Ϭ͘ϭϳϳ Ϭ͘ϭϯϯ
 ;Ϭ͘ϳϯϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϭϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϳϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϮϰͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϲϮϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϳϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϬϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϰϳͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϳϳϰ Ϭ͘Ϭϯϭϵ Ϭ͘Ϭϰϵϱ   Ϭ͘ϬϰϴϭΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϴϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴϬϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϵϳ
  ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϬϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϭϴͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϱϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϯϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϵϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϴϭͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  Ϭ͘Ϭϭϲϳ Ϭ͘ϭϮϲ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϴϯ   Ϭ͘ϬϱϬϭ Ϭ͘ϭϬϱ Ϭ͘Ϭϲϯϭ Ϭ͘ϭϯϬ
  ;Ϭ͘ϵϭϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϴϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϬϱͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϭϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϳϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϰϯͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ ͲϬ͘ϭϱϮ ͲϬ͘Ϯϰϳ ͲϬ͘Ϭϴϭϳ Ϭ͘ϰϵϱ  ͲϬ͘ϬϲϳϬ Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϴϭ ͲϬ͘Ϯϴϱ Ϭ͘ϬϮϵϮ Ϭ͘ϬϱϮϯ
 ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϯϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϮϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϲϰͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϯϯϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϵϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϰϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϰϵͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϳϴ Ϭ͘ϬϯϬϬ ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϯϲ   ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϵϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϰϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϱϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϮϲ
  ;Ϭ͘ϮϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϭϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϬϲͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϴϵϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϳϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϬϬͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϮϰϮ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϭϳ Ϭ͘ϰϲϭ   Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϴϯ ͲϬ͘ϮϴϬ Ϭ͘ϬϮϲϲ Ϭ͘ϬϱϭϬ
  ;Ϭ͘ϯϰϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϮϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϲϴͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϵϳϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϵϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϰϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϱϭͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV          
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH  6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH









 )XQGLQJIULFWLRQV  3RUWIROLRIULFWLRQV












ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ Ϭ͘ϬϮϲϮ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϭϰ ͲϬ͘ϭϳϯ Ͳϭ͘Ϭϭϰ  ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϴϰ Ϭ͘ϮϮϯ Ϭ͘ϬϭϭϬ ͲϬ͘ϯϯϯΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϴϲϮ
 ;Ϭ͘ϳϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϴϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϭͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϰϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϮϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϰϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϯϳͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϭϲϳ Ϭ͘ϬϳϬϴ Ϭ͘ϬϳϬϰΎ   ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϯϳ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϰϮ Ϭ͘ϬϭϳϬΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϮϴ
  ;Ϭ͘ϵϴϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϭϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϰϰͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϮϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϭϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϴϬϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϭϳͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  ͲϬ͘ϬϭϳϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϳϮϰ ͲϬ͘ϭϰϲ   ͲϬ͘Ϭϴϰϴ ͲϬ͘Ϭϴϴϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϵϮϭ ͲϬ͘Ϭϴϱϴ
  ;Ϭ͘ϵϭϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϴϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϲϮͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϮϵϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϯϴͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ ͲϬ͘ϮϮϰΎ ͲϬ͘ϭϭϲ ͲϬ͘ϭϭϬ ϭ͘ϯϬϭΎΎΎ  ͲϬ͘ϬϵϮϴΎΎ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϯϰ ͲϬ͘ϮϱϱΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϮϯϮΎ ͲϬ͘ϭϮϭΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϰϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϳϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϯϴͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϱϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϭϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϮϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϵϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϭϭͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϯϵϯ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϴϭ ͲϬ͘ϭϭϭΎΎΎ   ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϳϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϳϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϭϳ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϭϰ
  ;Ϭ͘ϰϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϲϴͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϭϵϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϮϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϳͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϭϮϬ ͲϬ͘ϭϲϴ ϭ͘ϭϵϭΎΎΎ   ͲϬ͘ϬϳϭϬ ͲϬ͘ϮϱϰΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϮϮϳΎ ͲϬ͘ϭϮϮΎΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϳϮϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϬϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϲϳͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϳϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϳϮͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV          
5VTXDUHG          
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH  6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH









 )XQGLQJIULFWLRQV  3RUWIROLRIULFWLRQV














ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ Ϭ͘ϭϲϳΎΎΎ Ϭ͘Ϭϲϳϴ Ϭ͘Ϭϲϯϱ ͲϬ͘ϭϲϭ  Ϭ͘ϬϳϬϳΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϱϰϮ Ϭ͘ϯϴϯΎ ͲϬ͘ϭϬϳΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϴϯ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϵϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϴϯͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϳϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϮϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϳϲͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϬϲ Ϭ͘Ϭϰϭϵ Ϭ͘ϬϮϭϳ   ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϳϮϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϰϭΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϴΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϵϯΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϱϱϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϱϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϱϯͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϭϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϴϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϳϭͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  Ϭ͘ϭϰϬΎ Ϭ͘ϭϮϯΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϬϳ   Ϭ͘ϬϱϬϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϴϳ Ϭ͘ϬϰϲϳΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϴϳϮ
  ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϭϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϭͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϯϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϰϰϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϭϮͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ Ϭ͘ϬϮϱϴ Ϭ͘ϭϰϭ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϱϯ ͲϬ͘ϭϰϬ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϲϯϴ Ϭ͘ϬϮϬϮ ͲϬ͘Ϭϲϭϴ Ϭ͘Ϭϯϰϴ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϰϯ
 ;Ϭ͘ϰϯϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϱϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϴϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϯϯͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϲϵϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϮϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϬϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϲϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϱϯͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϬϴ Ϭ͘Ϭϯϱϲ Ϭ͘ϬϭϮϬ   ͲϬ͘ϬϬϰϲϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϴϯϬ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϱϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϳϱϭ
  ;Ϭ͘ϱϱϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϯϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϳϰͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϮϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϯϭͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϭϯϵ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϵϳ ͲϬ͘ϭϮϵ   Ϭ͘Ϭϭϱϱ ͲϬ͘ϬϲϬϵ Ϭ͘ϬϯϮϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϯϱ
  ;Ϭ͘ϰϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϴϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϯϴͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϱϳϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϬϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϳϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϲϰͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV          
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH  6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH
)ULFWLRQ6WXGLHG )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ  3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR
;ϭͿ^ĞĞdĂďůĞϭĨŽƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
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 )XQGLQJIULFWLRQV  3RUWIROLRIULFWLRQV












ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ Ϭ͘Ϭϱϭϰ ͲϬ͘ϯϵϲ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϱϳϮ Ϭ͘Ϭϱϯϭ  Ϭ͘Ϭϯϵϵ Ϭ͘ϮϵϱΎ Ϭ͘ϰϬϭΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϭϱϵ Ϭ͘ϬϮϲϳ
 ;Ϭ͘ϯϬϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϴϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϬϵͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϯϵϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϬϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϵϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϳϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϲϮͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϰ Ϭ͘Ϭϯϱϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϭϰ   ͲϬ͘ϬϰϯϵΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϲϴΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϰΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϳϲϴ
  ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϴϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϭϯͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϬϴϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϮϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϱϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϱϵͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  ͲϬ͘ϬϯϰϬ Ϭ͘ϬϱϬϰ Ϭ͘Ϭϵϭϲ   Ϭ͘Ϭϰϯϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϭϵ Ϭ͘Ϭϰϱϳ Ϭ͘ϬϮϳϴ
  ;Ϭ͘ϴϭϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϲϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϱϬͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϱϮϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϱϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϮϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϰϴͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ ͲϬ͘ϬϵϬϭΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϱϱϴΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϭϲϵ ͲϬ͘ϵϮϴΎ  ͲϬ͘ϬϯϬϯΎ Ϭ͘ϬϴϳϭΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϯϱ ͲϬ͘ϭϲϮΎΎ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϰϭ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϳϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϳϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϱϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϱϴͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϬϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϰϭϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϰϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϮϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϮϵͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϱΎΎ Ϭ͘Ϭϯϴϰ Ϭ͘ϬϱϵϴΎ   ͲϬ͘ϬϮϭϱΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϲϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϴϱϴΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϳϲϯ
  ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϮϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϮϱͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϵϭϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϯϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϳϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϰϳͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϱϰϳΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϭϯϭ ͲϬ͘ϴϲϴΎ   Ϭ͘ϬϲϱϲΎ Ϭ͘ϭϯϮ ͲϬ͘ϭϱϯΎΎ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϯϯ
  ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϳϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϯϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϲϭͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϰϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϮϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϮϴͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV          
5VTXDUHG          
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH  6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH
)ULFWLRQ6WXGLHG )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ  3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR
;ϭͿ^ĞĞdĂďůĞϭĨŽƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ






 )XQGLQJIULFWLRQV  3RUWIROLRIULFWLRQV
















ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ Ϭ͘ϭϮϱΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϰϬϲΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϵϬΎ Ϭ͘ϭϲϯ  Ϭ͘ϬϳϰϱΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϭϲΎ Ϭ͘ϭϱϰ Ϭ͘Ϭϳϲϵ Ϭ͘ϭϬϰΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϱϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϱϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϳϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϱϮͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϵϱϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϱϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϴϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϴϴϳͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϬϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϬϯ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϰϲ   ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϯϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϭϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϱϯϱ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϳϭϰ
  ;Ϭ͘ϭϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϮͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϲϰϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϯϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϬϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϮϬͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  Ϭ͘ϮϯϭΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϳϲΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϲϱΎΎΎ   Ϭ͘ϬϴϱϳΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϳϲϮΎ Ϭ͘ϬϴϰϱΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϬϯΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϲϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϴϳϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϴϬͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϯϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϵϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϵϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϴϮϯͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϱϳ Ϭ͘ϯϴϮ Ϭ͘Ϭϵϭϰ Ϭ͘ϯϵϴ  ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϰϴ Ϭ͘ϬϯϬϴ ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϲϳ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϭϳ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϳϵ
 ;Ϭ͘ϳϳϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϭϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϮϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϴϮͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϱϬϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϮϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϬϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϵϲͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϲϴϵ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϱϱ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϰϬ   ͲϬ͘ϬϬϳϱϳ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϰϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϲϵ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϭϵ
  ;Ϭ͘ϭϭϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϯϵͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϯϲϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϰϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϰϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϮϮͿ
;/ŵƉĂĐƚͿȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚнȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϯϳϱ Ϭ͘Ϭϳϱϴ Ϭ͘ϯϳϰ   Ϭ͘ϬϮϯϮ ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϲϰ Ϭ͘ϬϬϵϵϴ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϲϳ
  ;Ϭ͘ϭϭϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϳϵͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϱϰϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϮϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϭϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϬϵͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV          




5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH









 &ƵŶĚŝŶŐĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ  WŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ












ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϳϬ Ϭ͘ϬϳϬϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϵϯϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϵϯ  ͲϬ͘ϬϭϯϬ Ϭ͘ϭϳϵ Ϭ͘ϯϮϴ ͲϬ͘Ϯϵϯ Ϭ͘ϬϴϮϴ
;Ϭ͘ϴϲϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϯϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϱϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϱϵͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϵϮϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϵϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϰϲͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭϭϬ Ϭ͘Ϭϱϭϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϰϬϵ   ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϯϯ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϮϰΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϵϰΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϮϱϴ
 ;Ϭ͘ϴϰϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϭϴͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϭϲϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϮϬͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  Ϭ͘Ϭϯϭϴ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϵϳ Ϭ͘ϬϮϭϭ   ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϭϲ ͲϬ͘ϬϯϳϮ ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϳϳ Ϭ͘Ϭϳϴϵ
 ;Ϭ͘ϴϲϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϴϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϵϲͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϵϰϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϭϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϳϵͿ
tĞƵƌŽͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϭϳΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϯϬΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϮϴΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϯϭΎΎΎ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϭϱΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϯϯΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϯϬΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϮϵΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϮϮΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϴϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϲϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϴϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϳϯͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϬϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϯϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϴϳϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϭϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϳϭͿ
dĐͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϭϳ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϬϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϳϲ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϴϵ  ϳ͘ϬϰĞͲϬϱ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϭϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϰϰ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϭϱϵ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϮϮ
 ;Ϭ͘ϴϵϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϱϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϬϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϴϯͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϵϯϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϮϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϱϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϴϲͿ
dĐͺΨh^͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϳϮϰ Ϭ͘ϬϮϳϰ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϬϳ ͲϬ͘ϬϮϳϱ  Ϭ͘ϭϭϬ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϴϴ Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϯϯ ͲϬ͘Ϭϴϱϳ ͲϬ͘ϬϱϮϴ
 ;Ϭ͘ϴϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϴϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϲϬͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϴϮϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϳϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϵϱͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϵϮϬͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV          
5VTXDUHG          
$GMXVWHG5VTXDUHG          
0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&KRLFH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH 6KRUW5DWH  6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH 6KDGRZ5DWH
)ULFWLRQ6WXGLHG )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ )XQGLQJ  3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR 3RUWIROLR
6HH7DEOHIRUVSHFLILFDWLRQ          

 
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7DEOH5ROHRIH[FKDQJHUDWHLQSULYDWHFODLPVLQIRUHLJQFXUUHQF\IXQGLQJDQGSRUWIROLRIULFWLRQV   
7KHGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH LV ORJ FKDQJHV LQQRQILQDQFLDO SULYDWH FODLPV WR IRUHLJQ UHVLGHQWV LQ IRUHLJQ FXUUHQF\7KHGDWD DUH TXDUWHUO\ IURP4 WR4 IRU DSDQHORI
GRPHVWLFDOO\RZQHGEDQNVZLWKIRUHLJQH[SRVXUHV$OOVSHFLILFDWLRQVLQFOXGHIL[HGHIIHFWVDVVSHFLILHGLQWKHORZHUSDUWRIWKHWDEOH6WDQGDUGHUURUVDUHFOXVWHUHGE\EDQN
DQGLQGLFDWHVLJQLILFDQFHDWWKHDQGOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\
 &ƵŶĚŝŶŐĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ  WŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ
          
 1RQH :KROHVDOH)XQGLQJ5DWLR
/LTXLG$VVHW







ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯ Ϭ͘ϭϵϬΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϲϲϮ Ϭ͘ϭϰϭ Ϭ͘Ϭϲϰϯ  Ϭ͘ϬϴϵϰΎΎ Ϭ͘ϭϰϭ Ϭ͘ϴϬϯΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϳϲ Ϭ͘Ϭϱϰϲ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϬϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϳϵϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϵϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϴϵϴͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϯϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϮϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϮϵϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϳϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϱϬͿ
ɇȴDWŽŵĞƐƚŝĐͺƚƚŽƚͲϯΎ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶͺƚͲϰ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϰϯ Ϭ͘ϬϰϮϭ Ϭ͘Ϭϭϭϴ   ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱϬϮ ͲϬ͘ϬϭϬϵΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϭϮϮΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϰϱΎ
  ;Ϭ͘ϮϴϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϰϯϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϲϵϵͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϳϳϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϯϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϱϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϴϬϲͿ
dŽƚĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨɇȴDWƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝĂŶďĂŶŬ  Ϭ͘ϭϱϵΎΎ Ϭ͘ϮϬϭΎ Ϭ͘ϮϭϬ   Ϭ͘ϭϭϮΎΎ Ϭ͘Ϭϰϭϵ Ϭ͘ϭϭϱΎΎ Ϭ͘Ϭϱϴϯ
  ;Ϭ͘ϬϰϯϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϱϭϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϭϮϭͿ   ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϮϮϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϳϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϯϬϵͿ
tĞƵƌŽͺũ͕ƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϭϵϳ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϲϮϳΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϲϮϳΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϲϮϵΎΎΎ  ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϮϭϴ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϲϮϮΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϲϱϬΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϲϯϴΎΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϬϬϬϲϲϭΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϮϭϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϮϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϯϵϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϱϭϭͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϭϴϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϭϴϭͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϲϰͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϮϮϱͿ
dĐͺũ͕ƚͲϭ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϳϲϱΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϱϳϲΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϱϲϮΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϱϱϭΎΎΎ  Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϳϱϱΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϱϳϲΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϱϴϵΎΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϱϯϲΎΎ Ϭ͘ϬϬϬϱϵϳΎΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϲϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϮϴͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϭϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϴϲϰͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϬϮϯϳͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϵϬϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϵϴϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϰϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϬϲϭϴͿ
dĐͺΨh^͕ƚͲϭ ͲϬ͘ϯϵϳΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϰϰϬΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϰϰϵΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϰϱϳΎΎ  ͲϬ͘ϯϮϲΎ ͲϬ͘ϯϲϭΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϯϱϴΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϯϳϰΎΎ ͲϬ͘ϯϱϳΎΎ
 ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϱϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϬϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϱϲͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϭϭϲͿ  ;Ϭ͘ϬϲϰϵͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϮϬͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϰϲϯͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϬϮͿ ;Ϭ͘ϬϯϱϰͿ
&RXQWU\IL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
%DQNIL[HGHIIHFWV <HV <HV <HV <HV  <HV <HV <HV <HV <HV
2EVHUYDWLRQV          
5VTXDUHG          
$GMXVWHG5VTXDUHG          
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